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1HE SAFETY Al'ID ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
by
Raymond E. Schweikart
ABSTRACT
I

The nuclear power plant has given

tion.) It offers a new source of heat.

n~ direc~ion

to power genera-

·~

The heat can now come from the

fission of atomic fuel and not from the burning of fossil fuel.
Safety and protection from the possible hazards of radioactivity
generated by nuclear power plants is a completely new and untested area.
-1

I

.

~~

Emergency systems and over-desigqed E nstruction are only part of what
~•
•
_A./.
.
~
0~
has to be done to make absolutely1 c~Ttain such accidents if they occur,
will be contained allowing no· harmful

radioacti~ity

-

to r each the environ-

ment. ( Handling of radioactive wastes is very critical in ;a nuclear power
. plant.

These wastes have to be storaged in protective containers and

transported to predetermined storage sites.

At these sites the containers

· of radioactive wastes are lowered into large salt mines.
Licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants during construction and operation is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission.
TI1e five member federal panel has issued strict requirements that must be
met in each step in the process of obtain·ing perrni ts and licenses, construction, and generation.

ifftd_~;:mnti&e£-rv-

Waldron M. ~Leilon, PhD, P.E.
Committee Chairman

'
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INTRODUCTION
Purpose
The purpose of this research report is to collect and present
a summary of readily available data that will be helpful in informing
on safety and environmental effects that nuclear power plants will have
on man and his environment.

A second purpose is to create an awareness

of the great need for nuclear power in the 21st century.

This report

1s the result of a great desire, on the part of the writer, to learn
as much as possible about present and future positions of nuclear power
plants and how they will co-exist in and arourid the community of today
and tomorrow.
Scope
The research of this report was largely conducted through an
extensive library search of books, magazines, and newspapers.

Inforrna-

tion was obtained from the Atomic Energy Commission, educational papers
of environmental nature and from construction contractors.
ture was found concerning the safety of nuclear power

Much litera-

pl~ts

from the

standpoint of a major accident and from the future effects of stored
radioactive waste materials.
This report includes an overview of nuclear power plants power
,

generation and their important role in this country's future.

This re-

port also includes technical information relating to ·nuclear power
plant construction, operation and handling of radioactive materials,
and transportation and storage of radioactive wastes.

Finally, conclu-

2

sions are submitted based on the findings for further research and
s~.

3

NUCLEAR POWER

Nuclear Power - General

r

The subject of t~j1 s report is the safety and environmental ef~ .,.t

fects of nuclear power
\

Cit

p~~ts,

by which is meant plants operated by

utilities to supply elect ricity to their customers.

Its purpose is to

\. present factual information on a number of topics relating to this
~ject.

About 80 per cent of the electricity used in the United States
is produced in steam-electric power plants.

These are the plants in

which heat from the combustion of coal, oil~ or natural gas (the fossil
fuels) converts water to steam.

The steam is then used to drive a tur-

bine generator and thereby produce electric power.
The nuclear

pow.e~

plant is a new kind of steam-electric plant

in which the heat comes not from the burning of a fossil fuel, but from
the fission of an atomic fuel, the basic source of which is uranium.
The turbine-generator part of a nuclear power plant is similar to that
of an ordinary steam-electric plant; and the product, electricity, is
. ..._
-

~

identical. ·
There are two pri ncipal incentives for developing and using
nuclear power.

First, it promises to reduce the cost of generating

electricity in sections of the country that are distant from coal mines
or oil or gas fields and therefore bear high fuel transportation costs.
Examples are the Northea t and the West coast where fuel costs typically
-···

r

account for about hal .~ ~he total cost of power generation.

Nuclear

4

power 1s already benefiting these sections by making a competitive energy source acceptable to them.
The second reason is that nuclear power promises ultimately t o
.

be an indispensable energy source, nation-wide.

/

While United States

reserves of fossil fuels (especially coal) are large, our rate of conSl..Dllption is increasing rapidly.

This is true not just in electrical

power generators, which presently account for about one-fifth of our
fuel consumption, but also in transportation, manufacturing, heating,
and other activities in which fuel is consumed in large quanti t i es.
Altogether, it has been estimated that we will use as much ener gy· from
fuel over the next twenty years as we used from the American Revol ution
to the present day.

When projected increases in the rate of energy

consumption are taken into account, the indications are that we would
deplete our fossil fuel resources in only two or three generations if

'
we were to continue our present pattern of fuel utilization.

In 1972 ,

we used 30 per cent more fossil fuel than what was produced f or power
I

generation (60 billion barrels) (American Broadcasting, 1973).

The us e

of nuclear fuels for generating electric power will help conserve fossil fuels and will greatly extend our energy resources for the future.
Nuclear Power Today
United States development of nuclear power began

ill

19 54, when

the Congress passed legislation permitting utilities and others besides
2

the Federal Government to own nuclear reactors (Lish, 1972).
Since 1954, a total of about 19 million kilowatts of atomic
power capacity has been placed into operation; plants with an additional
51 million kilowatts of capacity are in an advanced state of construe-

5

tion and an additional 86 million kilowatts of capacity are now being
designed.

These numbers are small in relation to the total amount of

United States electric generating capacity, which is currently almost
four hundred -nlillion kilowatts.

They, nonetheless, represent a signi-

ficant amount of power.t Figure 1 locates nuclear power plants in the
United States today.

The total capital investment made or committed to
·--.

date by United States utilities for nuclear power operation facilities
has reached and gone over the one billion dollar mark.
Jacksonville, Florida, has been chosen as the site. for a new
$200 million manufacturing facility which will build platform mounted
nuclear power plants on an assembly line

~as is.

These plants will be

capable of withstanding salt water exposure and the force of the ocean
for the life of the plant.

The plants will be rated at 2,000 megawatts
~

of output and weigh 140,000 tons (Florida, 1972).

The environmental ef;

fects from floating nuclear power plants would be greatly ;reduced as
compared to conventional

o~hore

plants.

.A

LEGEND
Operable (34) -------------- II
Bei ng Built (57) ----------- ~
P la~De d (Reactors ordered) - It
(81)

\

I

.(
I
\

Figure 1.

~uc l~r

'
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~

- \ \ (Supplied by Atomic Energy Commission, June 30, 1973)
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SAFE'IY
f

Safety and Radiation
ii

It. should be ~der\tood at the ~eginning that it 1s physically

--

impossible for a nuclear power plant to behave like an atomic bomb.

In

the latter, pieces of ~ss~ntia~ly pure fissionable ·m aterial are rapidly
.

·t

compressed into a dens~ mass which is forcibly held together for an instant of time to ~nable 1thE! chain J;"eaction to spread through it.

These

conditions do not and cannot exist in the reactors us~d in nuclear power
plants.

They use rel~tively dilute fuel; ~they are designed .along dif-

ferent principles; and they operate differently.
The

safe~

of nuclear power plants does not depend on res train-

1ng the force of nuclear energy but on containing the radioactive rnaterial it generates.
The fission process requires a particular kind of heavy element ,
such as uranium or plutonium, as a basic material.

Natural uranium i s

a mixture of three isotopes, atomic forms that are chemically alike but
vary in mass.

.An atom of one of these isotopes, uranium-Z·JS ;· oon read.

ily undergo fission when a free neutron strikes its heavy central nucleus.

The nucleus breaks into two pieces that fly apart at high speed;

in addition, two or three new neutrons are released.

The kinetic energy

of the flying fission fragments is converted to heat when they collide
with surrounding atoms, and the new released neutrons cause a chain reaction by initiating new fissions in other uranium-235 atoms.
· · 1 rad1oac
·
t 1ve
· rna t. er1a~s
· 1 generated are the "ashes ''
Th ~ pr1nc1pa

8

of fission - the so-called fission products . .A reactor generating 1
rnilliori kilowatts of electrical power for one year will produce 1200
kilograms of fission products, which one day after. shutdown has an ac.

tivity equal

·to

(_)).

.

some three billion curies (Moeller, 1969).

are a diverse mixture of substances.

The products

Some of the radioactive fission

products that are produced are radioactive iodine-131, radioactive
strontium-90, strontium-89, radioactive cesium-137, and radioactive
krypton- 85 (Simps1tn, 1972).

Some are gases, some are solids.

Some

have short radioactive half-lives, same have long half-lives, and some
are stable (non-radioactive).

The quantity of fission products f ormed

is small in terms of man - only a few pormds a day in a big plant - but
large in terms of radioactivity.

As the plant operates, the reactor ' s

inventory of radioactive fission products builds up gradually rmtil a
point is reached at which the rate they lose radioactivi ty jus t about
offsets the
off.

~

at which they are formed and then it essentially level s

.

All but a verj small amount (less than one-thousandth of one per

cent) of the material normally remains confined within the fuels .
Small additional arnormts of radioactive matter, called activation products, are formed in a nuclear power plant by exposure t o neutrons (LisR, 1972).

This only happens in and around the r eactor core,

which is the only part of the reactor where many neutrons are present.
Mbst activation products have very short half-lives and are of minor
importance in relation to fission products.
The basic rmit for expressing amounts of radioactivi ty is the
cur1e.

One curie of radioactivity is equal to a certain very large

number (37 million) of atomic desintegrati ons per second.

This rela-

tionship has little absolute meaning when appli ed to a mixture of radio-

9

active substances such as fission products.

The reason is that different

kinds and strengths of radiation are given off by diff~rent radioactive
materials.

For example, one kind (alpha particles) is blocked by an

ordinary piece -of writing paper, while another kind (gamma rays) can
penetrate several feet of concrete.~
'

t

-

Radiation Detection and Measurement

A very important aspect of radioactivity is. its detection and
measurement.

·~

The presence of atomic radiation (tmdetectable by htnnan

senses) is readily detected by several types of instruments.

One of

the simplest radiation detectors is ordinary photographic film, which
darkens on exposure to radiation.

It is used in the form of film badges

as a means of measuring the cumulative amounts of exposure received
during a given period by employees in nuclear power plants (Lish, 1972).
Other types of detectors such as geiger counters are us,ed to detect the
presence and measure the intensity of atomic radiation.
Radiation detection is also very sensitive in another way - it's
able to identify specific radioactive substances.

This is made possible

by the fact that every type of radioactive atom has a characteristic
pattern or radioactivity.
Those who operate nuclear power plants ca,n, through the use of
radiation detection and measurement instruments, maintain an extremely
close check at all times, not only on radiation levels in and around
the plant but also on the identity and amount of any fission products
present in plant effluents.

r
(

Radiation Safety Standards

.

The. problem of balancing risks against benefits in nuclear power

10
plants takes the fonn of radiation safety standards.·
The standards which govern acceptable practice in at.omic power
plants are detennined by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as part of
its statutory· ·responsibility tmder Federal law.

In setting those stan-

dards, the Atomic Energy Commission receives official guidance from the
Federal Radiation

Counci~

(FRi.} whose reconrrnendatiollS are subject to

the approval of the President and whose membership includes the Secretaries of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Defense,
Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, and the "chairman of the Atomic Energy
Connnission.

Also, the AEC has the assistance of the National Connni t tee

on Radiation Protection and Measurements, . and of several advisory committees which the AEC has established.

~e Federal Radiation Council has recommended that whole body
radiation exposure of members of the general public not exceed 500 mil lirems per year.

The millirem

(~usamiths-of-a-rem)

is a standard

measurement that takes into account the properties of the kinds of radiation involved.] The AEC' s radiation safety standards are des igned

accordingly.

The AEC' s basic radiation safety standards are published

in the Code of Federal Regulations and are, in fact, laws .
Other numerical guidelines are that nuclear power plants must
be designed to limit radioactivity in effluents to levels that would
keep resultant radiation exposures of persons living-)lear the plants
to less than 5 per cent of the average natural bac
(Nuclear Power, 1972).

grDun~

radiation

Natural background radiation comes f rom natural -

ly radioactive substances.

These substances

a~e

present . in common place

materials, such as granite, and also in the human body . Part of the
potassium and carbon in the body, f or example, is radi oactive.

The

11
average exposure from natural background radiation in -the United States
ranges from 100 to 125 millirems per year.

Thus, the 5 per cent level

would be about one per cent of the federal radiation protection guidelines of 500--m±llirems per year.

-·i
1

·-

-:

-.

I
-
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CONTROL
- .. - OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DURING OPERATION

The Reactor Core
A large water-cooled reactor contains SO to 100 tons of fuel .
The fuel material most commonly used today is slightly enriched uranium
dioxide (U0 2) in the form of small cylindrical pellets .

The heat f rom

fissioning a pound of U-235 (l ess than one per cent of whole uranium)
is large, with the ultimate thermal potential of 1. 4 thousand tons of
coal or 6,000 barrels of oil (Garney, 1972).

The pel l et s are placed

in thin-walled metal tubes to f orm fuel rods , a number of which are
bundled together i n a long met al can to make up an assembly known as
a fuel element.

A number of these are positi oned i n a pre-determined

grid to make up what is known as the reactor core . The core
. is contained in a mass ively construct ed steel tank, known as the reactor
vessel, through which cooling water fl ows (Lish, 1972).
The supply of fi ssi on product s in the plant, after several months
of operation, amounts to sever al hundred pounds.
are, of course, found inside the fuel.

On

The fission products

a weight basis, in excess of

99.99 per cent of the fi ssi on product supply of the plant normally remains confined within the f uel elements . . It is difficult for the fission products to leave t he fuel.

There are two reasons for this fact.

First and most i mportant, it i s the nature of uranium dioxide to hold
onto the fission products.

Second, fission products which manage to

break loose f rom the uranium dioxide must find a way to get past the
fuel cladding (the metal tubes) in order to get out.

Those that do get

13

out of the fuel enter the ·coolant.
When the time comes to refuel the plant, which 1s done annually,
the reactor is shut down and the top of the reactor vessel is removed.
A crane is us-ect-·to lift out the spent fuel elements and move them to a
storage vault or pool.

There they are left for several months to allow

for the shorter-lived radioactivity to subside.

By the end of this

-

cooling off period, nearly all of the gaseous fission products have
lost their radioactivity.

The fuel elements are then loaded into rug-

gedly built lead-shielded steel containers for shipment by truck, rail
or barge, to a plant where they will be chemically processed to recover
their unused fuel content for future use.

It is at the processing plant

that the fission products contained in the fuel elements are removed,
concentrated

an~

stored, except krypton-85 which is released as a gas

to the atmosphere.
The Coolant System
There are two basic types of water-cooled reactors - pressurized
water reactors (A~) and boiling water reactors . CB1~) (Forman, 1970).
In the former, the reactor cooling water or primary coolant is kept
under sufficient pressure to keep it from boiling in the reactor vessel.
On leaving the reactor vessel it passes through a steam generator in

which it gives up its heat to a separate stream of water or secondary
coolant, thereby cqnverting the latter to steam; then it flows back to
its reactor (see Figure 2).
In a boiling water reactor the flow pattern is different.

In

this case, the reactor cooling water is allowed to boil in the reactor
vessel so that the steam is generated in the r eactor (Gofman, 1971).
Additional steam may be generated in a separate heat exchange similar
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to that in a pressurized water plant.

This steam goes to the turbine,

is condensed, and the condensate is returned to the reactor vessel.
It is important to llllderstand that in both systems the primary
.

'

coolant circulates within a closed equipment circuit and is completely
cut, off from its original source, such as a river, lake, or ocean.
fact, in all commercial nuclear power plants, the

?~Y

In

water that goes

from a waterway into the plant and then empties back directly into the
waterway is that which is used to cool the turbine condensers.
water does not flow through the reactor.

This

Its sole purpose is to carry

non-usable heat away from tl!e plant.
~~

the power plant operates, the reactor cooling water picks

up some radioactivity.

One source is leakage of some fission products

through minute imperfections in the fuel element cladding.

These fis-

sion products, amollllting to something like one-thousandths of one per
cent of the fission product supply of the plant, are prin~ipally the
gaseous and more eaSily vaporized solid parts of the fission-produced
mixture.

Another source of radioactivity in the reactor cooling water

is activation products.

These include activation products formed in

the water, most of which have a very short half-life (an example would
be radioactive nitrogen which has a half-life of only a few seconds)
(Lish, 1972) and activation products.

These are folllld in reactor struc-

tural materials and enter the coolant through corrosion or erosion.
To maintain the purity of the water and to limit the amount of
radioactivity in the primary cooling system, the reactor coolant is
purified.

This is done by draining off a portion o£ the primary cool-

ant flow, passing it through purification equipment, and then returnLng it to the system (Gofman, 1971).

16
Radioactive Waste Handling at the Plant Site
In addition to processing a portion of the primary coolant flow,
the coolant purification system may also handle water collected from
other points ·m· the reactor system (for example, water that has leaked
out, of equipment, or that has been used to clean out equipment during
maintenance operation).

The purification is done by means of evapora-

tion, demineralizers and filters.
All but a small fraction of the solid or liquid radioactive
substances removed during the purification process are collected as
waste concentrates, which are then stored.

The balance, averaging a

few millionths of a gram per day during rputine operation, is discharged
to the waten.,ray serving the plant in a dilute waste stream in amorn1ts
which meet the AEC standards for drinking '·ater.

Further dilution oc-

curs as the waste stream is mixed in the waten.,ray.
The radioactive gases removed during the purification process
average a few hrn1dred thousandths of a gram per day during routine
operation.

This material is released to the atmosphere through a tall

chimney on a controlled basis to assure that there is sufficient dilution and atmospheric dispersion of the radioactivity to meet AEC regulations which are based on an annual radiation exposure that might be

'.

.

received by persons living at and around the plant site.
The radioactive waste concentrates from the purification process,
toget~er

with other miscellaneous solid wastes are encased in concrete

and steel barrels.

When a sufficient ntnnber of barrels accwnulate,

they are shipped from the plant to an AEC approved site for burial or
long-term storage.

17
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CLEAR ACC IDENf,.s

a reactor_ can

opera~e

safely is limited

I

by the capacity of its cooling system in other words, the rate at
which the primary coolant can carry away the heat generated in the re actor core.

If the heat were to be generated at a faster rate than i t

1s carried away by the coolant, the fuel would overheat and could melt
or even vaporize.

The consequences might. range from heavy radioactive

contamination of the coolant (through the release of fission products
from another fuel) to damage to the reactor equipment and some release
of radioactivity from the primary reactor system into the plant containment system.

o:.

J

Therefore , one type of accident that 1s taken into cons i der ation
during design is that of nuclear excursion - an accidental increase in
the rate of fission chain reaction.

This also would cause high t ern-

peratures to be reached in the fuel and cause chemical r eactions be tween reactor material that would increase the amount of energy involved.
Natural

Safe~ards

Nuclear reactors tend to slow therhs elves down when nuclear excursions occur.

Several factors contribut e t o thi s characteristic.

The

most important factor is called t he "Doppler effect" (Forman , 1970) .
This is a complex phenomenon.

'When the t emperature of the f uel rises ,

the proportion of neutrons captured by non-fissioning atoms increases
and the rate of fission t ends to slow down . The "Doppler effect" is

18

not only automatic but instantaneous, and offers immediate resist~ce
to any increase in reactor power level.
A second factor is that as the fuel becomes hotter, its density
decreases slightly, which also acts to lower its reactivity.
Thirdly, in water-cooled reactors, the water . that flows through
the reactor case, besides carrying away the heat, serves also to moderate the neutrons and encourages the

-fission chain reaction.

Just as

the fuel density decreases, with increasing temperature, so does the
density of the .water which again lowers the reactivity.
In normal operation, the temperature of the fuel cladding 1s
kept well below its melting point (Lish,

~972).

Then the fuel tempera-

ture can rise and fall during an excursion without affecting the make-

up of the fuel elements.
Design Safeguards
To understand how reactors are controlled, it 1s necessary t o
explain what is known as "excess reactivity." To start a reactor and
maintain normal operation, more fuel than is required for a fission
chain reaction must be added to the reac·t or.

This extra fuel furnishes

excess reactivity against which the system can draw to sustain the chain
reaction as the reactor operates.
For normal operation, there must be a means of compensating f or
the excess reactivity that 1s present in the reactor core.

In other

words, there must be a way of controlling the rate at which the excess
fuel is consumed.

This is done by adding "negative reactivity" in the

fonn of substance that absorb neutrons.

By moving these · substances into

and out of the reactor core with adjustabl e control rods, t he amount of
neutrons in the core can be decreased or increased, thereby slmvi ng down

19
or speeding up the reaction . .
Reactors controlled in this way are equipped with a number of
control rods, some of which are used only for emergency shutdown of
the reactor. ·'In many reactors , solutions containing _n eytron absor:bers,
such as borax, are added to the primary coolant, either for routine
control or for use during shutdown (Lish, 1972). All reactors are

--

equipped with instrumentation to monitor the amount of neutrons in the
reactor core.

This instrumentation is what controls the adjustment of

the control rods in the reactor.

In emergency situations where the

core is overloaded with neutrons, the contro.l rods can be lowered into
the reactor quickly thereby shutting down. the reactor.
Similarly, other instruments monitor other aspects of thereactor operation, such as the level of coolant in the reactor vessel,
the temperature of the coolant leaving the reactor vessel, and the pressure of the primary reactor system.
a rapid shutdown of the reactor.

All these instruments can trigger

.

If a power failure should occur, mech-

anical devices will take over and insert the control rods into the reactor core.

Yet another safeguard takes the form of emergency stand-

by desiel generators.

The Florida Power Corporation nuclear plant at

Crystal River has two such units .
Failure of Cooling System
Overheating of the fuel could also be caused by an interruption
~ the flow of coolant through the reactor core when the reactor is

operating in a normal manner.

Also, once the fuel has been in service

in a reactor it continues to give off heat when the reactor is shut

down and even after it has been removed from the reactor.

Tnis results
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from the radioactivity of the fission products and, while not nearly as
intense as the heat that is generated during reactor operation, it
could lead to melting of the fuel

~lements

if cool.i ng were not provided

(Gofman, 1971}-. _:._: nstnnnents monitor the coolant system and in · cases
of either minor leaks or of out-right loss of coolant, the reactor is
automatically shut down.

Also, a standby coolant system is provided

to cool the reactor core during reactor shutdown in the case of loss

of coola'n0
____ ____.,

r-. '-'
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o
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Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) are intended to cool a
reactor's extremely hot core in the event that it loses its normal
coolant through a ruptured pipe, a broken weld, or a key valve opened
in error. c---E.xpe.~t-5-Gal-1 this type of accident "the maximum e:redible ac-

cident" that a reactor can possibly sustain (Gillette, May 1972).
prived of the cooling water, a reactor's core temperature would qui ckly

rise to the melting point of the fuel element

metals~ Wi~in an hour

a large reactor core could melt and drop to the floor of the reactor
vessel.

·~Experts say that a loss of neutron modeiating water would prevent a nuclear excursion from occurring, but residual heat in the core plus heat released by decaying fission products in the fuel and by
violent chemical reaction between metal and remaining water - could
still amollllt to 50 megawatts of energy.

This would he -rror-e than enough

t~~allow the core to melt through the steel reactor vessel, and to carry

it through tons of concrete and steel below, within another hour or so.

Beyond this point, the molten core could 3ust keep

goin~(Gillette,

May

1971) .
Experiments are being conducted as part of the preliminary wor k
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leading up to research wi~ the Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facility in
Area, Idaho, a $35 million domelike structure in which the AEC will
progressively starve a 55 megawatt .reactor of coollng water and measute-·fts behavior (Gillette, September 1972).
in +963 at a projected cost of $18 million.

The LOFT project started
The WFT experiments,

which are scheduled to begin in 1975, will provide the first test of

--

.

an emergency core cooling system under actual operating conditions.
(By 1975, 80 nuclear plants could have used the results of these experiments.)

The model is designed to lose its cooling system and melt

revealing what would actually happen in the worst type of accident.
The facility is now 80% complete and by no means ready to be used. With
the costs running toward the $35 million mark, allowing the unit to
destroy itself is beginning to create many skeptics within the atomic
energy field.
I

Another project in Idaho 1s the Power Burst Facility (PBF)
(Gillette, September 1972).

It was completed in the summer of 1972.

Completion was four years late with 100% overruns at a cost of $8 million.

Its purpose is to subject nuclear fuel facilities to abnormal

stress conditions and to observe fuel rods before and after an accident.
There are conflicts of opinions on all sides as to overruns, delays, objectives and goals of these two projects.
One experiment has shqwn (using

~

small scale model) that when

loss of coolant occurs, high steam pressures within the reactor vessel
actually restrain all but about 10% of the emergency cooling water from
entering the vessel (Gillette, May 1971). ·
Another experiment showed that temperatures of some of the fuel
elements may go higher as a result of loss of coolant than had previously
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been expected.

This is a matter of concern because the higher a fuel

element's temperature rises, the more likely it is ~ 0 rupture, spilling
intensely radioactive fission products into the reactor vessel.

MOre-

over -~ -the higher temperature of the fuel rods, which are typically clad

in ~irconitm1 alloy, would intensify a chemical reaction between the

metal and the cooling water.

This would release hydrogen, generate

still more heat, and thus place an even heavier demand on the emergency
cooling system.
Accidental Criticality
Accidental criticality refers to the possibility of a fission
chain reaction starting by accident (Gofman, 1971).

A chain reaction

could start in an amount of fuel considerably less than a full reactor
load.

The answer to this type of accident i s "safe geometry," which

means ensuring that a critical mass cannot be assembled under any cirCtmlStances.

The safeguards include designing shipping containers so

that it is physically impossible to load an unsafe number of fuel elements ·into them, and equipping fuel

s~orage

vaults with spacer devices

so that safe geometry is assured.
Vapor Containment
Vapor containment 1s the final safeguard against radioactive
substances escaping from the plant to th~ environment (Fonnan, 1970).
The basic concept of vapor containment is that it will endure
the maximum credible accident.

This type of accident would have to oc-

cur through multiple failures, such as the sudden and complete loss of
the primary coolant, the failure of the emergency cooling system to
operate and· the overheating and melting of the fuel elements.

Thus,
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the vapor containment shell would have to withstand the extreme pressures and all of the radioactive substances that would be r eleased.
There are two types of vapor containment sys t ems used today in
nucrear power plants using water-cooled reactor~.
One type makes use of a large spheri cal or cylindrical steel
shell that encloses the entire reactor.

The shell, which in a large

--

plant might be the height of a twenty story building, is constructed
by welding together sections of steel plate .

In plants that are lo·-

cated at a distance from population centers , a single contai nment shell
is used. -For plants that are located near or in population. centers,
more elaborate r equirements are used.

For example, metropdli t an Chicago

has, as of las t year , five nuclear power plants in operation, two under
construction and six on order (American Broadcasting, 1973) . Shells
for these plants ar e double-walled, have zer o leakage features, and
are surrounded by a thick concrete radiation shield.

A ~jor accident
'

within this type of a shell would have essentially no effect on the
surrounding envi r onment.
A second type of containment system is known as the "pressure
suppression system ." In this sys tem, the reactor vessel is located in
a steel containment tank surrounded by a concr ete radiation shield .
The containment tank (the dry well) i s connected by pipes to a second
tank (the wet wel l) that is partially fi l l ed with 'ater.

The entire

unit is housed below ground level wi thin a special! constructed building.

In the event of an accident within the reactor, the vapor would

pass into the dry well and from t here through pipes ~to the wet well.
The pressure surge would be relieved b the a or condensation.
The nuclear power plant at Crystal

r uses the first type of
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containment shell or vessel.

It is made up of a one inch thick steel

inner liner surrounded by a three

fee~

thick rei nforced concrete shell.

The vessel's fotmdation is a 27 feet thick reinfor ced concrete mat.
Before-operation, the pressure in the vessel is ·raised t o 67 pounds per
square inch and held at that test pressure for twelve hours.
sel is approximately 200 feet tall and 180 f eet in diameter.

The ves-
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RADIOACTIVE AND 11-IERMA.L WASTES
Nuclear power generation creates problems unique unto itself.
Figure 3 shows the course radioactive substances follow from mining

--

through disposal.

Refining and reprocessing of reactor fuels to obtain fissionable
components results in the production of several by-products. Most of
these isotopes have short half-lives and decay to a safe level in less
than a year.

Temporary storage is therefore feasible as a means of

averting environmental contamination. However, elements such as strontium-90, cesium-137, and plutonium are also present.

These have half-

lives of ·lumdreds or thousands of years, and constitute a prolonged radiation hazard

(Radioactive Wastes, 1972).

By the year

·zooo,

according to present projections, storage will

have to be provided for about 27,000 megacuries of radioactive wastes in
the United States; these wastes will be generating 100,000 kilowatts of
heat at that time.
The wastes will include about 400 megacuries of alpha

emitters~

Of these, the plutonium-239 with a half-life of 24,000 years will be
dangerous for about 200,000 years.
Chemical Reprocessing Plant
At the chemical fuel reprocessing plant, the fuel elements,
which have confined the radioactive materials, are d1ssolved and processed.

Mbst of the radioactive materials are retained iri underground
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tanks at the processing site, but three volatile radionuclides - i odine131, krypton-85, and tritiliDl - may be discharged to the atmosphere.

The

iodine-131 is substantiaily reduced by storing the ' fuel elements before
processing.
content by

In 100 days, radioactive decay wi ll r educe t he iodine-131

a factor

of 5000 and various waste gas cleaning techniques

are then utilized to minimize its discharge into the atmosphere.

At

present, krypton-85 is discharged to the atmosphere, and most of the
tritium is discharged to the environment as water.
Only one commerci al plant, the Nuclear Services Plant at West
Valley, New York, is currently operating and this only since 1966.
During this time , liquid discharges have imposed an average dose of
75 millicuries per year at the bolllldary.

Essentially no iodine- 131 has

been emitted. As for the other main gaseous effluents, all the krypton85 ~d hydrogen- 3 contained in the fuel has been released.
Another report listed the releases of this plant to be 14 curies
of ·strontium-9 0 in waste water and one million curies of krypton- 85
vented to the atmospher e (Gi llette, June 1971) . These f i gures ar e below the permi tted rel eases but far exceed the worst case among nuclear
power plant emiss ions.
Technol ogy is now availabl e for reducing liquid discharges, and
processes for r et aining krypton- 85 and hydrogen-3 are being developed
at AEC laboratori es.

Proper ly oper ating radi ochemical plants in the

future should emit no mor e radioactivi ty than do pr operly operating reactors - that is , less than 10 per cent of the natural background radiation at the plant bmmdary .
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Confinement
Long life isotopes can be separated from other nuclear waste
components, concentrated, and confined to prevent release of radiation.
For -example, law level wastes are stored in steel-lined concrete containers and stored 20 feet below the surface.

1

The containers deteriorate

slowly and the components decay to safe radioactive levels by the time

--

that significant leakage occurs.
High level wastes are being stored undergroood as liquids in
steel-lined concrete vaults.

Such storage has not yet been found to

result in release of radioactivity beyond the immediate area. However,
leaks have been detected in tanks, so increases in ground water could
cause widespread contamination.

Research is being conducted.on cal-

cinatmg wastes to granular form or evaporating solutions to produce
crystals for storage.
Transport
6
It 1s projected that by the year 2000 there should be 10 mega-

watts of nuclear power available, of which two-thirds will be liquid
metal fast breeders.

From this one can expect 7000 to 12000 annual ship-

ments of spent fuel from reactors to chemical plants, with an average
of 60 to 100 loaded containers in transit at all times.

Projected ship-

ments might contain 1.5 tons of core fuel which has decayed for about
30 days, in which case each shipment would generate 300 kilowatts of

thermal pmver and 75 megacuries of radioactivity (Weinberg, 1972).
Today, a container might contain only 7 megacuries and produce 30 kilowatts.
Design of a completely reliable shipping container is complex.
As now conceived, the heat would be transferred to air by liquid metal
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or molten salt; and the container would be provided with rugged shields
which would resist defonnation that might be caused by a train wreck.
To be acceptable the shipping containers must be shown to withstand a
30 minute fire and a drop from 30 feet onto an linyielding surface.
Storage
Other techniques have been proposed to handle the large volumes
of radiocative wastes expected in the future . Separated wastes in
stainless steel containers may be placed in c~verns excavated in deep
metamorphic bedrock.

Tunnels which receive waste containers can then

be capped, and fractures or fissures in the rock sealed by grouting.
The containers would eventually disintegrate.

Hmo~e

er, leakage would

be slow since the hydraulic gradient of bedrock is lm , l astes have
higher density than surrounding ground water, and components such as
plutonium are only slightly soluble.

The primary disadvantage is the

excavation costs.
Vulcanization
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory has proposed that reactor wastes
be vulcanized or incorporated into molten silicate rock.

Liquid wastes

could be injected into a cavern, blasted at a depth of 2000 ft. with
nuclear bombs.

The liquids would self-boil and evaporate to solids.

the chimneys are capped, the solids would melt and dissolve into the
surrounding rock. ·This eventually freezes and traps the wastes in a
solid matrix (Radioactive Wastes, 1972).
Salt Hines
The main advantages of bedded salt are primarily that, because
salt dissolves in water, the existence of a stratum of bedded salt is

If
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evidence that the salt has not been in contact with circulating water
during geologic time.

This is reinforced by the fact that salt has

been found to be the best material available beca~ e of its seismic
stabil1ty, compressive strength, ability to conduct heat, high 'melting
poi~t (1450°F), self-sealing ability and shielding p~operty which 1s

similar to that of concrete (Holden, 1971) .
Containers of hot solidified high l evel wastes, which range m
size up to 18 feet long and 2 feet in
salt mines in railroad cars.

diamete~are

transported t o the

They are then lowered down shafts into

large rooms that have been carved out of a salt strata.

The pressure

of the salt, and the heat of the cylinders ranging from 600°F to 900°F,
will cause the natural plastic action of t he salt, which has . the consistency of very hard wax-, to seal around the containers. Within a
period of months to 10 years the s teel covered ceramic containers will
disintegrate leaving the salt to hold the wastes in place.
Heat Discharge
In the most efficient fossil fuel thermal power plant, about
40 per cent of the generated heat is turned into power.

Most of the

remaining 60 per cent is .transferred to cooling water in the turbine
condensers.

For nuclear power plants about 70 per cent of this heat

release finds its way to the cooling water.

The heat discharged and

wasted from the crystal River 800 megawatt nuclear unit is sufficient
• to increase by 1S°F a 200 feet wide , 10 feet deep discharge canal f l ow-

measures.

Both wet and dry cool ing towers are used and there is no heat
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discharge whatever into surrounding bodies of water. · .
The most obvious objection to the tower concept 1s its cost,
both capital costs and the increased plant operatiTI.g costs it. imposes.
An even strange~ _o~jection is its appearance.

Large dual towers might

only be suitable for industrial parks or rural areas.

Another objec-

tion to cooling towers is fog, near airports; for example, a vapor
plume rising several hundred feet above a tower is not desirable.

Also

freezing vapor may create icing conditions in the surrounding area .
Cooling towers also generate large quantities of steam in a cold eli ..mate which .is objectionc;ilile to neighboring coimllUili ties.
Off-stream cooling ponds are one
limited water supply.

~lternative

for plants of

The greatest problem is the availability and

cost of land, which may run into several million dollars - 1 ,000 to
2,000 acres per 1,000 megawatts depending on the economics of t he plant.

Dilution is another possibility for keeping down

~he

water

'

teffiperature in a large water supply.

A t)rpical installation is the

Oyster Circle Nuclear Plant of the Jersey Central Power and Li ght
pany on Barnegal Bay , New Jersey.

Com~

Circulating water f lows t o the con-

densers of the 640 megawatt Unit #1 at 460,000 gpm ; an additional
780,000 gpm 1s not pumped through the condensers but goes di r ectly from

the intake to the discharge canal , f or ced by t hree low-head axial-flow
pumps (Richards, 1968).
Suitable dispersion of t he warm water dis charge 1s usuall y a
minimum requirement for keeping t otal water temperature \vithin an acceptable limit.

Near Richland, Washington, a c:onduit , 1~ feet in di-

ameter flowing at more t han 13 fps, carries 564 ,000 gpm 1000 feet ~o
mid-channel of the Columb i a River where it is discharged through four
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vaned outlets.

This discharge serves the 860 megawatt Hanford Nuclear

Generating Plant of the Washington Public Power Supply System (Richards,
1968).
Another effective method of· dispersing heated water is.to discharge it at the surface with a horizontal velocity of 2 to 5 fps.
The momentum of this jet if properly direct~d will carry the heated
water several thousand feet into the waterway, almost as effectively
as a closed conduit.
It is practical to consider combinations of two or more means
of

r~ducing

a problem of heated water.

For example, the discharge can

be passed through a limited area cooling pond or a cooling tower before returning it tp the original river source.
fish mortality at the intake screens.

Of importan.ce also is

In some seasons, several tons

of fish per day have accumulated on intake screens due to high intake
water velocities and brought plant operation to a halt.' Other environ-

.

mental factors include destruction of fish spawning areas during and
after the construction of water handling facilities and the alteration
of wildlife refuge areas by excavating cooling water canals and ponds.
A point that should be made is that thermal effects from power
generation plants do not necessarily cause thermal pollution in cooling
waters.

In many cases, heated water discharges do not strain the eco-

system of a given river or cooling lake.

In cases where proper plant

thermal inputs may cause harm to a particular ecosystem, supplementary
cooling equipment can be used.
New technologies will permit increase thermal efficiency of
nuclear power plants and at the same time begin to put to use the lowgrade waste . heat that is now dissipated into the air and water.

A

33

population of 450,000 could enjoy year-round comfort· conditioning with
a

~000

megawatt nuclear plant providing electricity, heating and air

conditioning (Simpson, 1972).
ner,

supplement~l_ J'l~at

To provide air conditioning in this man-

from the turbine cycle would be used to power

a li thium-bormide air conditioning system ..
. Other possible uses of waste heat include secondary sewage
treatment and agricultural applications to speed up or extend growing
seasons.
Cost and Environmental Factors
The cost of protecting the environment must be factored in projections of future costs of electric prn~er.

During the 1960's, the

electric utility industry accounted for an average of 14 per cent of
all air pollutants discharged into the air.

But the industry also

purchased approximately 90 per cent of all the air pollution control
equipment sold in the United States, spen~ing beuveen 1967 and 1971,
about $1.6 billion on both air and wat~r pollution control equipment
(Simpson, 1972).

Many more billions of dollars will have to be spent

between now and 1975 to meet the tough nffi~ EPA regulations for air pollution discharges.
The increase in investment costs caused by pollution control
regulations for fossil-fired plants in 1976 will be 7 per cent for
gas, 26 per cent for oil, and 23 per cent ·for coal plants.

Nuclear

plants costs will be 5 per cent higher.
Base investment costs of a coal plant will rlse from $110/kw of
capacity in 1965 to $241/bv in 1975 because of .inflation~

Nuclear plant

costs will almost double, ris ing from $155/kw to $ 30 6/~, .

But when
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the costs of environmental protection are added, coal costs r1se to
$297/kw and nuclear to $321/kw in 1975.

Environmental protection costs

change the spread between nuclear fuel and cost from $65/kw to $24/kw
in 1975 (SimpsonJ _1.912).

The lower cost of nuclear fuel more than off-

sets the capital costs differential between coal and nuclear.

---
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LICENSING AND REGULATION
No one may build a nuclear power plant without rece1vmg a construct~on

pennit and then an operating license from the United States

Atomic Energy Commission .

---

. The Atomic Energy Commission is an independent agency of the
Federal Government headed by a five member commission appointed by the
President (Forman, 1970).
To obtain a construction permit from the AEC, the applicant must
submit his technical experience and financial responsibility.

One of

the requirements within the financial area is that the applicant must
have a specified amount of insurance coverage against possible public
liability.

A typical new plant will carry about $600 rriillion in insur-

ance (Garvey, 1972).· Figure 4 illustrates the time and reports required
by the AEC of the Florida Power Corporation in order to construct and
operate the nuclear power plant at Crystal River.
The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is required by
the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to assess the potential environmental impact of any proposed nuclear power plant before
issuing the applicant a construction permit for the plant (New Guidelines,
1972).

In addition a more thorough assessment is made after construc-

tion is begun but before the operating license is issued.

In each case

the applicant is required to submit to the AEC an environmental report.
In general, it contains (1) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided,

0 months

Utility company decides t o construct
nuclear power plant
~

18 months

Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and
Preliminary Environmental Impact Study (PEIS)
submitted to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
~

42 months

Figure 4.

,

Construction of nuclear power plant
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and
Final Environmental Impact Study (FEIS)
submitted to AEC's Division of Reactor
Operations
';

108 months
(9 years)

,

AEC's Division of Reactor Licensing analyzes documents and issues construction permit
~

102 months

,

~

Operational testing of nuclear power plant
I
AEC issues operating license ~o utili_~ co11pany . j

I

I

Flow Diagram of Licensing Procedure for the Nuclear Power Plant at Crystal River, Florida
(Supplied by Mr. H. L. Bennett, Director of Generation Construction, Florida Power Corporation, Crrstal River, Florida)

~
~
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should the proposal be implemented, (3) alternatives to the proposed
action, (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5)

~y_ irreversible

and irretrievable commitments ' of re-

sources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented (Wilson, 1973).
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1HE SAFElY RECORD

Even though nuclear power generation is quite young in the United
States, the amount of electricity that has been produced 1s already 1n
the billions of kilowatt-hours.
During this time there has been no instance of radiation injury
.

to any worker in nuclear power plants.

The radiation exposure to the

envirorunent has been far below that allowed by the AEC regulations.

The

oldest plant in the country which has been in operation for 12 years has
had no excessive release of radiation (American Broadcasting, 1973).
There has been no instance of an accident of the type discussed earlier

m this report.
The startup operation may extend over several
or longer.
period.

mon~s

to a year

Extensive check out procedures are instituted during this

The plant is started at a very low level and then is increased

to the full rated power of the plant.

During this period the reactor

usually experiences many automatic shut downs due to over sensitive control instruments or minor component failures.
In normal operation one factor is becoming quite important in
r elating nuclear power plants to that of fossil-fuel electric plants.
The factor is that in nuclear plants the ·components that get the hardest
wear are the reactor fuel elements.

These elements are replaced when

the plant is refueled at from one to two year periods..

In fossil fuel

.plants the components that get the hardest \vear are the tubes in the
f urnace section of the steam boiler, \vhich of course are permanent type

39

components.

In time, these tubes present the most ser1ous operation

and maintenance problems of this type plant.
Recently, the AEC released a new all incornpassing .safety report
which included

d~~cussion

of regulatory processes, design of nuclear

power plants, safety precautions, etc.

The report stated the probability

of a critical accident of any given nuclear power plant in any given
year is one in a 1000.

TI1e AEC also projects approximately 1000 nuclear

power plants operating by the year 20 00 .

This then implies that there

could be at least one accident per year.

They state that an accident

of this type would release no more than 10 curies of biologically harmful radioactive iodine, an amount asserte9. harmless to the surroilllding

population. They list the probability of the steel pressure vessel failing as one in a million (Gillette, January 1973).
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CONCLUSIONS
The nuclear power plant of 1973 1s a relatively inefficient way
of gen~rating electric power; its thermal efficiency is only about 32%
and it d?es not utilize the fuel energy potential of uranium fuel.

But

in the .context of the 1975 Envirorunental Protection. Agency requirement,
it is clearly head and shoulders above the fossil fuels because of its
minimal effects on the environment.
The indus try is now taking steps to provide for the very rapid
and continuing growth of electric power and energy requirements and to
do this in a manner that will pr ovide acceptable environmental impact
to the maximum extent for which the public is willing to pay the cost.
The need for power product ion is urgent and
or -construction delays are unfortunate.

obvio~.

.

Planning

An awareness and understanding

of each party's pr oblems and considerations 1are essential to construe-

-

tive efforts to provide the necessary electrical power without destroying the world around us .
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